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This	 special	 issue	 gathers	 and	 enlarges	 upon	 papers	 that	 were	 first	 presented	 at	 the	
interdisciplinary	 ‘Corruption	 Downunder’	 symposium	 held	 at	 the	 University	 of	 Auckland	 in	
November	2015;	most	of	the	papers	published	here	stem	from	the	lively	and	collegial	discussions	
at	 the	 symposium.	At	 that	 time	New	Zealand	was	authoritatively	measured	 (by	Transparency	
International)	to	be	Number	2	‘least	corrupt’	nation	in	the	world;	it	is	now	tied	at	Number	1	with	
Denmark.	What	this	rank,	as	measured	by	Transparency	International’s	Corruption	Perceptions	
Index	(CPI),	actually	counts	for	is	something	that	we	explore	in	this	special	issue.	On	the	face	of	
it,	it	would	seem	perverse	to	be	focusing	on	corruption	in	such	a	place	as	New	Zealand.	With	its	
larger	northern	neighbour	Australia	listed	at	a	respectable	11th	out	of	175	that	same	year	(2014	
data),	why	would	a	bunch	of	academics	want	to	engage	in	serious	discussions	about	the	problem	
of	corruption	‘downunder’?	New	Zealand	has	never	been	ranked	outside	of	the	top	four,	and	has	
been	 ranked	 Number	 1	 in	 a	 total	 of	 12	 out	 of	 22	 years	 since	 the	 survey	 began.	 Australia	 is	
generally	ranked	in	the	top	ten	and	has	never	been	out	of	the	top	13	least	corrupt	countries	since	
the	survey	began.	
	
Yet	the	CPI	and	the	other	widely	used	benchmark	standards,	such	as	the	World	Bank	Worldwide	
Governance	Indicator,	have	been	subjected	to	sustained	critique	for	distorting	and	manipulating	
the	 measurement	 and	 understanding	 of	 corruption.	 Before	 we	 describe	 some	 typically	
antipodean	 examples	 of	 corruption,	 we	 look	 at	 how	 the	 definitional,	 conceptual	 and	
methodological	weaknesses	of	those	measures	of	corruption	distort	the	perception	of	developed	
capitalist	nations	like	Australia	and	New	Zealand.	
	
First,	definitional	critiques	of	such	benchmarks	tend	to	focus	on	corruption	in	the	public	sector	to	
the	exclusion	of	the	private	sector.	Corruption	is	treated	as	most	serious	when	it	is	precipitated	
by	 the	unnecessary	 concentration	of	 economic	decision‐making	 in	 the	hands	of	 governments.	
Neo‐liberal	 evangelising	 against	 public	 sector	 corruption	 is	 generally	 based	on	 the	 claim	 that	
privatisation	and	competition	can	purify	corrupt	state‐owned	enterprise	dominated	economies.	
Moreover,	the	link	between	counter‐corruption	strategies	and	neo‐liberal	constitutionalism	can	
be	 found	with	a	growing	 frequency	 in	 the	policies	and	public	statements	disseminated	by	 the	
International	 Financial	 Institutions	 (IFIs)	 (Brown	 and	 Cloke	 2004).	 Because	 neo‐liberal	 logic	
projects	the	market	as	an	ideal‐typical	space	in	which	efficiency	and	transparency	in	transactions	
can	be	more	easily	obtained,	corruption	can,	the	argument	goes,	be	eradicated	by	privileging	the	
‘hidden	 hand’	 forces	 of	 the	 market,	 expressed	 in	 the	 decisions	 of	 competing,	 self‐interested	
participants.	In	other	words,	privatisation	and	competition,	rather	than	state	controls	on	capital,	
will	 produce	 less	 corruption.	 This	 position	 is	 summed	 up	 by	 one	 of	 the	 most	 prominent	
corruption	experts:	 ‘If	 the	economy	 is	 fully	 competitive,	 then	no	 corruption	can	occur’	 (Rose‐
Ackerman	1978:	208).	There	is	a	certain	(if	taut)	logic	to	this:	if	there	are	less	rules,	then	the	rules	
will	be	broken	less.	The	idea	that	the	capitalist	markets	can	rid	societies	of	corruption	simply	by	
outsourcing,	 however,	 is	 chimera.	 In	 capitalist	 societies,	 particularly	 those	 that	 follow	 the	
organising	logic	of	neo‐liberalism,	there	is	an	in‐built	contradiction	between	law‐abiding	values	
and	the	norms	that	encourage	profiteering	and	capital	accumulation	above	all	other	social	values;	
and	corruption	can	be	understood	as	the	outcome	of	this	contradiction	(Whyte	2007).	It	is	notable	
in	this	respect	that	the	New	Zealand	government	itself	uses	a	much	wider	definition	than	standard	
definitions	applied	by	the	World	Bank	or	the	dominant	anti‐corruption	organisations.	Thus,	the	
Department	of	Justice	notes	that	‘New	Zealand	criminalises	bribery	and	corruption	in	both	the	
public	and	private	sectors,	challenging	traditional	conceptions	that	corruption	is	purely	a	public	
sector	issue	(New	Zealand	Government	n.d.:	3).	
	
Second,	methodological	critiques	tend	to	focus	upon	the	issue	of	how	the	data	are	gathered.	Some	
have	pointed	to	the	general	tendency	of	using	a	subjective	and	selective	sources	of	expert	opinion	
(Sampford	et	al.	2006).	Other	measures	are	over‐reliant	upon	data	sets,	such	as	those	generated	
in	the	IFIs	 that	are	established	with	the	purpose	of	capturing	 the	 types	of	corruption	that	are	
predominant	 in	developing	counties	 (Andersson	and	Heywood	2009).	There	have	also	been	a	
number	of	critiques	that	focus	upon	bias	in	the	substantive	focus	of	corruption	measures	(Tax	
Justice	Network	2015;	Wedel	2014.	One	reason	that	we	should	be	sceptical	about	New	Zealand’s	
and	Australia’s	positions	in	those	charts,	then,	is	that	the	received	wisdom	projected	by	surveys	
like	 the	 CPI	 is	 exactly	 that:	 received	 wisdom	 rather	 than	 concrete	 evidence.	 The	 CPI	 merely	
measures	the	 impressions	of	a	large	group	of	observers	and	experts	around	the	world	that	are	
selected	for	the	survey.	In	the	sense	that	it	is	based	on	perceptions	of	groups	of	people	who	are	
perceived	to	be	experts,	the	CPI	can	actually	be	said	to	be	doubly	subjective	(Whyte	2015).	
	
Third,	conceptual	critiques	identify	how	different	types	of	corruption	are	conceptualised	across	
different	 socio‐economic	 contexts.	Corruption	scholars	 typically	distinguish	between	collusive	
corruption	 (where	 two	 parties	 collude	 for	 their	 common	 benefit)	 and	 extortive	 corruption	
(where	 one	 party	 is	 compelled	 to	make	 a	 bribe	 payment	 to	 another)	 (Hindricks	 et	 al.	 1999;	
Klitgaard	1988).	It	is	the	former	rather	than	the	latter	that	more	accurately	describes	corruption	
in	strong	economies	as	against	weak	economies.	Yet	it	is	the	latter	rather	than	the	former	that	
underpins	the	indicators	used	to	measure	the	global	corruption	problem.	Extortive	corruption	is	
not	 a	major	 problem	 in	 developed	 countries	 (though	 it	 is	 probably	more	widespread	 than	 is	
thought);	it	is	less	common,	for	example,	to	be	asked	to	bribe	a	public	official	in	New	Zealand	and	
Australia	 than	 in	 some	 other	 countries.	 Collusive	 corruption	 which	 involves	 more	 complex	
interactions	between	parties	who	plan	to	collude	for	mutual	benefit	characterises	corruption	in	
developed	countries.	Thus,	forms	of	corruption	such	as	price	fixing	and	tax	evasion	often	involve	
the	collusion	of	one	or	more	party	for	mutual	benefit.	This	point	is	routinely	recognised,	even	in	
the	governments	of	the	countries	that	benefit	from	this	conceptual	distortion.	A	recent	Australian	
Senate	Select	Committee	noted	in	May	2016	that:	
	
Corruption	in	Australia	–	a	very	wealthy	country	by	global	standards	–	is	not	the	
same	as	corruption	 in	a	poorer	country	…	the	kinds	of	corruption	risk	 in	a	 rich	
country	are	not	 typically	small	 scale	bribes	 to	 low	 level	officials,	but	 in	 corrupt	
conduct	 that	 influences	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 laws	 and	 awarding	 of	 government	
business.	(Australian	Senate	2016:	9)	
	
Even	in	parliamentary	bodies	such	as	this,	there	is	growing	awareness	of	the	dangers	of	being	
pre‐occupied	with	 extortive	 corruption—bribery	 or	 fraud	 by	 public	 officials—rather	 than	 the	
collusive	 corruption	 of	 the	 type	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 found	 in	 the	 New	 Zealand	 and	 Australian	
systems.	Yet	it	is	the	former	with	which	surveys	like	the	CPI	are	still	primarily	concerned.	Indeed,	
some	of	the	most	egregious	cases	that	we	discuss	below	do	not	fit	the	types	of	corruption	that	
expert	sources	typically	use	to	build	a	picture	of	corruption	in	the	CPI	league	tables	and	other	
global	benchmarks.		
	
By	 way	 of	 example,	 New	 Zealand’s	 surveillance	 authority,	 the	 Government	 Communications	
Security	Bureau	(GCSB),	had	been	found	in	2013	to	have	broken	the	law	in	spying	on	the	country’s	
own	citizens	(Schwartz	2013).	So	legislation	was	introduced	to	make	such	spying	lawful	in	future:	
the	Government	Communications	Security	Bureau	and	Related	Legislation	Amendment	Bill	2013.	
The	corruption	disappears.	Not	exactly.	
	
	A	year	later,	New	Zealand	was	to	experience	a	national	election	marked	by	‘dirty	politics’	(Hager	
2014).	 This	 was	 not	 mere	 smearing	 and	 falsehood—though	 there	 was	 plenty	 of	 that—but	
involvement	of	national	security	agency	officials	in	collaboration	with	a	disreputable—and	since	
convicted—blogger,	to	discredit	opposition	politicians.	The	blogger,	who	was	close	to	ministers	
in	 the	 conservative	 government,	 released	 and	 misrepresented	 this	 information	 with	 the	
knowledge	of	the	then	Prime	Minister.	Further,	the	same	right‐wing	blogger	had	accessed	stolen	
information,	 hacked	 from	 the	 opposition	 Labour	 Party’s	 computers,	 to	 be	 similarly	 deployed.	
Without	 too	 great	 an	 exaggeration,	 these	 and	 similar	 contemporaneous	 events	 have	 been	
compared	to	Watergate	(Loewenstein	2014);	there	were,	after	all,	certainly	proven	lies	and	cover‐
up	at	the	highest	governmental	level.	For	his	pains	in	exposing	this,	prize‐winning	investigative	
journalist	Nicky	Hager	was	subjected	to	intimidatory	and	heavy‐handed	police	raids	presumably	
seeking	his	journalistic	sources	and	their	data,	raids	that	found	nothing	of	interest	and	that	were	
later	 judged	by	a	court	to	have	been	unlawful	(Nicholas	Alfred	Hager	v	Her	Majesty’s	Attorney‐
General	[2015]	NZHC	3268).	
	
In	these	two	cases,	no	money	needed	to	change	hands.	It	is	possible	but	unlikely	that	money	was	
involved.	 The	 purpose	 of	 these	 types	 of	 corruption	 practices	 is	 institutional	 collusion	 for	 a	
common	purpose.	And	that	purpose	may	also	work	on	an	international	level.	After	all,	Britain,	
through	its	Government	Communications	Headquarters	(GCHQ),	and	the	United	States,	through	
its	National	Security	Agency	(NSA)—both	of	which	are	part	of	the	‘five	eyes’	intelligence	alliance	
that	 includes	 Australia	 and	 New	 Zealand	 (and	 Canada)—have	 acted	 unlawfully	 by	 making	
unwarranted	recordings	of	telecommunications	of	their	citizens.	This	is	collusive	corruption	of	
the	highest	order.	It	involves	key	state	agencies	secretly	conspiring	to	break	the	law	in	ways	that	
compromises	the	constitutional	relationship	between	state	and	citizen.	Yet	this	is	not	a	form	of	
corruption	 that	 would	 necessarily	 pre‐occupy	 or	 even	 worry	 ‘expert’	 informants	 or	 indeed	
feature	in	analyses	of	those	states’	vulnerability	to	corruption.	
	
The	collusive	corruption	that	is	found	at	the	heart	of	the	security	state	has	two	key	features.	First,	
it	is	directly	related	to	the	lack	of	accountability	and	public	visibility	of	security	intelligence	and,	
second,	it	is	related	to	the	extent	of	political	support	enjoyed	by	such	institutions.	It	is	precisely	
because	the	same	two	features	are	most	pronounced	in	the	most	dominant	sectors	of	the	economy	
that	there	is	a	tendency	for	collusive	corruption	to	cluster	around	those	dominant	sectors.	In	a	
country	like	the	United	Kingdom,	there	are,	for	example,	high	levels	of	collusive	corruption	in	the	
finance	 sector,	 weapons	 manufacturing	 and	 trade,	 and	 privatised	 carceral	 ‘services’	 (Whyte	
2015).	 Applying	 the	 same	 general	 logic,	 concentration	 of	 this	 type	 of	 corruption	 might	 be	
expected	 in	 agricultural	 and	 other	 primary	 industries	 in	 New	 Zealand	 and	 in	 mining	 and	
extractive	 industries	 in	 Australia,	 as	 well	 as	 (in	 both	 countries)	 property	 development	 and,	
indeed,	 privatised	 and	 state‐supported	 services	 generally,	 including	 health,	 education	 and	
transport.	It	is	to	examples	from	those	industries	that	we	now	turn	in	order	to	understand	how	
corruption	has	become	an	issue	of	acute	public	concern	in	Australia	and	New	Zealand.		
	
The	first	part	of	our	discussion	focuses	on	the	agriculture	industry.	In	New	Zealand,	the	‘flying	
sheep	 scandal’	 in	 2015	 saw	 ‘[c]laims	 of	 corruption,	 bribery	 and	 lies	 …	 made	 about	 the	
Government’s	unorthodox	scheme	of	flying	live	sheep	to	Saudi	Arabia’	(Edwards	2015).	The	flying	
sheep	 were	 part	 of	 a	 NZ$11.5	 million	 package	 (Kirk	 and	 Vance	 2015)	 granted	 to	 a	 Saudi	
businessmen,	Hmood	Al	Khalaf—with	close	connections	to	that	country’s	royal	family—to	allay	
his	 disappointment	 at	 loss	 of	 profits	 attendant	 on	 New	 Zealand’s	 live	 sheep	 export	 ban.	 The	
Labour	Government	had	prohibited	such	 livestock	exports	 to	Saudi	Arabia	 in	2004,	after	 that	
country	had	rejected	the	unloading	of	an	entire	shipment	of	57,000	sheep	purchased	in	Australia	
by	 Al	 Khalaf,	 with	 more	 than	 5,000	 sheep	 subsequently	 dying	 of	 heat	 exhaustion.	 Al	 Khalaf	
suffered	a	setback	to	his	business	through	the	ban:	he	had	exported	some	five	million	live	sheep	
for	slaughter	in	the	Middle	East	between	1989	and	2003;	had	invested	NZ$20	million	in	a	sheep	
breeding	program	in	New	Zealand;	and	owned	three	sheep	farms	there	(Gulliver	2015).	The	Saudi	
businessman	had	reportedly	been	given	to	understand	that	the	National	Party	Government	would	
reverse	the	ban	after	its	election	in	2008	(Gulliver	2015).	When	this	did	not	happen,	he	used	his	
influence	with	 the	 Saudi	 royals	 to	 have	 a	 free	 trade	 agreement	with	New	 Zealand	 shelved	 in	
addition	 to	 threatening	 to	 sue	 the	 New	 Zealand	 government	 for	 up	 to	 NZ$30	 million	
compensation.	 The	 innovative	 deal	 to	 recompense	 Al	 Khalaf	 and	 avoid	 these	 threatened	
consequences	included	New	Zealand	government	funding	of	NZ$6	million	towards	development	
of	his	improbable	‘agribusiness	hub’	where	sheep	would	be	bred	in	air‐conditioned	sheds	in	the	
middle	of	 the	 Saudi	desert,	 slaughtered	and	processed	 for	 consumption	 there,	 a	NZ$4	million	
‘settlement’,	plus	NZ$1.5	million	to	fly	900	pregnant	ewes	across	from	New	Zealand.	These	‘less	
than	 transparent	 or	 robust	 processes’	 (Edwards	 2015),	 critics	 have	 pointed	 out,	 would	 be	
criminal	if	they	benefited	a	public	official	rather	than	a	wealthy	entrepreneur	with	influence	over	
public	 officials.	 Sure	 enough,	 the	Auditor‐General’s	 eventual	 inquiry	 (Provost	 2016)	 found	no	
corruption	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 New	 Zealand	 Crimes	 Act	 1961,	 though	 she	 did	 find	 ‘significant	
shortcomings’.	
	
A	further	instance	of	corruption	that	exposed	the	agricultural	industry	was	the	‘Fonterra	scandal’	
in	 New	 Zealand	 in	 2013.	 In	 this	 case,	 bacteria‐infected	milk	 products	 had	 been	 sold	 in	 huge	
quantities	to	China	by	New	Zealand’s	multinational	dairy	cooperative,	Fonterra,	which	controls	
over	90	per	cent	of	the	dairy	industry	in	that	country	and	is	the	world’s	biggest	dairy	exporter.	
There	were	months	of	delay	between	the	first	detection	of	the	bacteria	and	the	notification	and	
eventual	product	recall.	The	company	was	fined	NZ$300,000	(in	an	NZ$11	billion	a	year	export	
industry)	for	its	safety	infringements	(Kirk	and	Kloeten,	2014)	Naturally,	there	were	accusations	
of	cover‐up,	just	as	there	had	been	in	January	of	the	same	year	when	government	officials	as	well	
as	the	company	were	implicated	in	the	failure	to	disclose	the	discovery	of	chemical	residues	in	
milk	products	(Fox	2013).	Fonterra	was	already	‘a	bit	tainted’	by	its	failure	to	‘blow	the	whistle’	
on	its	Chinese	partner	company	SanLu	(in	which	it	held	a	43	per	cent	stake)	in	2008,	during	the	
Chinese	melamine	 poisoning	 disaster	 in	which	 six	 or	more	 infants	 died	 and	 thousands	were	
caused	severe	kidney	damage	(Fox	2013).	In	2014,	when	New	Zealand	milk	exporter	Oravida	was	
experiencing	difficulties	getting	its	product	into	China	after	the	Fonterra	scandal,	the	country’s	
Justice	Minister,	Judith	Collins,	who	is	married	to	a	director	of	Oravida,	diverted	from	her	official	
business	during	a	visit	to	China	on	completely	different	(justice‐related)	matters,	to	make	public‐
relations	endorsements	of	Oravida	products	(Vance	and	Fox	2014),	and	had	a	dinner	meeting	
with	 a	 senior	 Chinese	 border	 official,	 along	 with	 Oravida’s	 managing	 director	 (New	 Zealand	
Herald	2014).	Oravida	has	donated	some	NZ$65,000	to	the	ruling	National	Party,	for	which	Collins	
was	a	government	minister	(Vance	and	Fox	2014).	Collins	had	been	deeply	implicated	in	the	‘dirty	
politics’	affair	mentioned	above,	and	the	cumulation	of	these	and	other	improprieties	led	to	her	
eventual	resignation,	and	the	official	withdrawal	from	her	of	the	title,	‘Honourable’.	
	
The	stripping	of	honours	is	not	exclusive	to	the	east	side	of	the	Tasman	Sea.	In	2014,	two	former	
New	South	Wales	(NSW)	Government	ministers,	Joe	Tripodi	and	Eddie	Obeid,	were	divested	of	
their	 titles.	 The	NSW	 Independent	 Commission	 against	 Corruption	 (ICAC)	 had	made	 findings	
against	them	of	corruption	in	public	office.	Both	had	been	renowned	right‐wing	‘numbers	men’	
of	 the	 Australian	 Labor	 Party	 in	 that	 state,	 and	 both	 had	 been	 ‘bagmen’,	 demonstrating	
paradigmatically	the	connections	between	political	donations	(open	and	clandestine),	effective	
bribery,	and	‘influence	peddling’	(McClymont	and	Besser	2014).	Obeid,	currently	serving	a	gaol	
sentence	for	this	offence,	and	Tripodi	were,	in	2017,	again	found	corrupt	by	the	ICAC,	together	
with	Tony	Kelly,	another	former	minister	of	the	NSW	Labor	Government,	 through	use	of	their	
ministerial	 positions	 in	 the	 awarding	 of	 a	 lucrative	 government	 contract.	 Former	NSW	Labor	
Party	Minister	for	Primary	Industries	and	Mineral	Resources,	Ian	Macdonald	(another	prodigious	
receiver	 of	 political	 donations	 and	 purveyor	 of	 influence)	 is,	 like	 Eddie	 Obeid,	 in	 gaol	 for	
misconduct	in	public	office,	after	investigations	by	ICAC.	Macdonald	had	contrived	to	award	in	
2008	a	coal	mining	licence	to	his	friend,	erstwhile	mining	union	leader	John	Maitland,	for	tens	of	
millions	of	dollars	below	its	market	value.	Maitland	was	also	gaoled	in	2017	as	an	accessory	to	
this	 crime	 (ABC	News	 2017).	 Eddie	Obeid,	 his	 son	Moses	 and	 Ian	Macdonald	 are,	meanwhile,	
awaiting	trial	for	conspiracy	to	commit	misconduct	in	public	office	over	the	award	of	a	AU$30	
million	coal	mining	lease	that	the	Obeid	family	had	secretively	secured	for	their	cannily	acquired	
rural	 property	 (McClymont	 2017),	 the	 subject	 of	 an	 ICAC	 corruption	 finding	 in	 2013.	 Coal,	
Australia’s	second	largest	export	industry	after	iron	ore	and	its	concentrates,	is	valued	at	some	
AU$42	billion	per	annum	(2016	figures).	
	
Yet	the	corrupt	personal	aggrandisement	of	the	Obeids	and	their	ilk	is	relatively	small	beer	and,	
in	some	ways,	its	official	prosecution	is	a	distraction	from	the	main	game	of	endemic	corruption	
under	 neo‐liberal	 capitalism.	 By	 comparison,	 the	 gargantuan	 Indian‐owned	 multinational	
corporation,	Adani,	has	Queensland	state	government	support	for	its	AU$16.5	billion	Carmichael	
coal	mine—said	to	be	the	world’s	largest	export	coal	mine	(Four	Corners	2017)—planned	for	the	
environmentally	sensitive	Galilee	basin	in	that	state,	with	a	388	km	railway	link	and	a	dedicated	
port	 adjacent	 to	 the	 Great	 Barrier	 Reef	 World	 Heritage	 Area.	 Approval	 from	 the	 state’s	
Coordinator‐General	was	granted	in	2014	and	the	railway	development	stage	of	the	project	was	
reported,	in	October	2017,	as	due	to	‘break	ground’	within	days	(McCarthy	2017).	The	Australian	
federal	government	is	enthusiastic	about	the	project	and	has	shortlisted	it	for	a	AU$1	billion	loan	
from	 its	 Northern	 Australia	 Infrastructure	 Facility	 to	 finance	 the	 rail	 link,	without	which	 the	
project	 is	 not	 viable.	 In	 a	 further	 subsidy,	 the	Queensland	Government	 has	 granted	 the	mine	
unlimited	access	over	a	60‐year	period	to	groundwater,	drawing	from	the	artesian	basin	over	an	
area	of	 thousands	of	square	miles,	 inevitably	degrading	 farmland	where	water	 is	scarce	(Four	
Corners	 2017).	 In	 India,	 Adani	 has	 an	 egregious	 record	 of	 environmental	 harms,	 including	
infringements	of	its	licence	conditions	and	flagrant	breaches	of	regulations,	its	coal	port	at	Vasco	
in	Goa	being	but	one	 instance.	The	company	wields	 formidable	power	as	a	giant	of	the	Indian	
economy,	with	 investments	 in	mining,	power	 stations,	 real	 estate	 and	agribusiness	as	well	 as	
numerous	ports	on	both	west	and	east	coasts	of	India.	It	has	been	‘dogged	by	allegations	…	of	
money	laundering	and	bribery’	in	addition	to	environmental	devastation	(Four	Corners	2017).	In	
2010,	the	Adani	Group	illegally	mined	and	exported	almost	8	million	tonnes	of	iron	ore	from	its	
port	 adjacent	 to	 the	 small	 fishing	 village	 of	 Bekeleri	 in	 Karnataka;	 Stephen	 Long	 quotes	 an	
ombudsman’s	report	deeming	this	a	‘mafia‐type	operation’	(Four	Corners	2017).	The	Ombudsman	
from	Karnataka	details,	from	documents	seized	from	Adani,	some	half	a	million	dollars	of	bribes	
(in	Australian	currency	terms)	between	2004	and	2008	alone,	made	by	Adani	to	port	authorities,	
customs	officials,	police,	mines	and	geology	officials	and,	indeed,	members	of	parliament	(Four	
Corners	2017).	
	
Adani	 is	 also	 suspected	 by	 the	 Directorate	 of	 Revenue	 Intelligence	 of	 ‘trade‐based	 money	
laundering’	for	which	it	has	been	issued	a	number	of	show	cause	notices.	It	uses	shell	companies	
and	tax	havens	‘to	firstly	cheat	the	Indian	tax	authorities	…	And	secondly,	cheat	the	shareholders	
of	their	own	companies’	through	over‐invoicing,	according	to	public	interest	litigator,	Prashant	
Bhushan,	who	is	prosecuting	a	High	Court	case	against	the	Adani	Group.	Bhushan	points	out	that	
these	are	crimes	under	the	Indian	penal	code	and	have	gone	unpunished	apparently	because	of	
political	protection	(Four	Corners	2017).	What,	then,	might	be	expected	of	Adani’s	future	activities	
in	 Australia?	With	 an	 opaque	 ownership	 structure	 connected	 via	 Singapore	 to	 the	 tax	 haven	
Cayman	Islands,	the	Adani	coal	port	on	the	Queensland	coast	is	set	up	to	transfer	funds	either	to	
the	Cayman	Islands,	or	to	the	British	Virgin	Islands,	using	railway	trusts	and	the	(likely	Australian	
government‐subsidised)	rail	corridor	as	pipelines	(Four	Corners	2017).	Adani	companies	have	
form	for	precisely	this	sort	of	manoeuvre	in	India.	In	2014	they	used	fake	mark‐ups	via	middle	
companies	in	the	Emirates	and	transfer	pricing	to	rake	off	a	billion	dollars	to	their	tax	haven	in	
Mauritius	(Four	Corners	2017).	
	
Tax	evasion	is	widespread	in	both	Australia	and	New	Zealand.	In	April	2016,	publication	of	the	
‘Panama	 papers’,	 11.5	 million	 files	 from	 the	 Panama‐based	 law	 firm	Mossack	 Fonseca,	 drew	
attention	to	money‐laundering	and	tax	evasion	at	the	highest	level,	on	a	scale	hitherto	hidden,	
using	foreign‐based	shell	companies.	Some	1,000	Australians	were	identified	in	the	Panama	files,	
involving	over	AU$2.5	billion	of	offshore	funds,	according	to	federal	finance	and	justice	ministers	
(Karp	2016).	The	Australian	state	established	a	Serious	Financial	Crimes	Taskforce	in	May	2015,	
which,	16	months	later,	had	recouped	over	AU$130	million.	Yet,	according	to	recent	research	by	
Oxfam	Australia,	‘tax‐dodging	practices	by	multinationals	deprived	the	nation’s	public	coffers	of	
as	much	as	[AU]$6bn	in	2014	alone’,	while	‘one	in	three	large	companies	reported	on	by	the	ATO	
[Australian	Tax	Office]	paid	no	tax	in	that	financial	year’	(Szoke,	cited	in	Karp	2016).	According	
to	 Shadow	 Assistant	 Treasurer,	 Andrew	 Leigh	 (cited	 in	 Karp	 2016),	 ‘most	 Australian	 tax	
avoidance	is	done	within	current	laws	via	tax	loopholes	the	government	prefers	to	ignore,	not	
evaded	 illegally	 by	 criminal	 syndicates…’.	 Numerous	 Australian	 companies,	 for	 example,	
including	the	‘millionaire	factory’	Macquarie	Bank,	use	corporate	arrangements	in	Malta	(from	
where	the	Panama	scandal	emanated)	to	minimise	their	tax	obligations	(Chenoweth	2016).	
	
The	Panama	papers	also	revealed	the	extent	to	which	New	Zealand	itself	serves	as	a	tax	haven.	At	
the	time	of	their	publication,	foreign	profits	for	the	beneficiaries	of	New	Zealand’s	overseas	trusts	
were	lawfully	kept	tax‐free	and	hidden.	This	enabled	more	than	12,000	offshore	trusts	to	pay	no	
tax	to	New	Zealand	on	their	overseas	profits;	neither	their	beneficiaries	were	registered,	nor	their	
accounts	 vested	with	 any	 public	 office	 (Chenoweth	 2016).	 New	 Zealand	 trusts	were	 used	 by	
Mossack	Fonseca	to	hide	funds	from	Panama	companies	set	up	for	the	Chief	of	Staff	to	Malta’s	
Prime	Minister	and	 for	 its	energy	minister.	Mossack	Fonseca	used	 for	 tax	avoidance,	via	both	
Malta	and	New	Zealand,	its	links	to	small	Pacific	Island	Economies	such	as	Samoa,	which	has	close	
relations	with	New	Zealand.	In	1996,	the	Panama	law	firm	obtained	the	exclusive	right	for	twenty	
years	to	operate	offshore	companies	in	the	island	of	Niue	(population	1,190)	and	even	drafted	the	
Niue	legislation	to	allow	this	(Chenoweth	2016).	
	
If	 this	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 distinctly	 neo‐colonial	 form	 of	 corruption,	 in	 an	 antipodean	 context,	
‘domestic’	 forms	 of	 corruption	 undoubtedly	 have	 their	 origins	 in	 the	 form	 that	 colonisation	
adopted.	 While	 land	 allocation	 to	 those	 favoured	 by	 crown	 officials—and	 to	 the	 officials	
themselves	and	their	families—is	a	common	feature	of	white	‘settler’	colonialism,	the	renovated	
corruption	 inherent	 in	 contemporary	 land	 development	 and	 associated	 zoning	 and	 (lack	 of)	
regulation	 is	 a	key	 feature	of	neoliberalism.	 Jane	Kelsey	 (2015)	 shows	corruption	 related	 top	
property	 development	 to	be	 intertwined	with	 financialisation	 and	actuarialisation,	with	 all	 of	
their	 criminogenic	 tendencies.	 In	 NSW	 alone,	 no	 less	 than	 ten	 Liberal	 party	 members	 of	
parliament	were	forced	to	resign	as	a	result	of	an	ICAC	anti‐corruption	operations	over	the	2011	
state	election	campaign,	with	most	of	these	instances	involving	political	donations,	notably	from	
property	developers	but	also	a	privatised	utilities	(water)	provider	(Chen	2014;	Harris	2014).	
Having	privatised	the	generation	and	transmission	of	electricity,	the	state’s	ports,	and	AU$500	
million	of	public	housing	and	home	care	for	the	aged	and	disabled,	the	Baird	(Liberal)	government	
of	NSW	went	on	to	privatise	the	State’s	Land	Titles	Office,	which	generates	some	AU$60	million	
per	 annum	 of	 revenue.	 As	 Australian	 Greens	 spokesman	 David	 Shoebridge	 notes,	 ‘It	 puts	 a	
corruption	risk	at	the	heart	of	land	titles	in	NSW’	(Seccombe	2016).	
	
If	the	preceding	examples	are	selective,	they	do	provide	evidence	that	corruption	cuts	across	key	
aspects	 of	 public	 and	 private	 sectors	 in	 both	Australia	 and	New	 Zealand.	 Indeed,	 each	 of	 the	
contributions	to	this	special	issue	show	that	the	New	Zealand	and	Australia	brand	of	corruption	
arises	from	practices	that	have	become	normal	in	business	and	politics	in	many	developed,	as	
well	as	developing,	countries.	The	first	article	that	adopts	this	theme	is	from	Scott	MacWilliam	
and	Michael	Rafferty,	who	explore	via	 the	cases	of	sub‐Saharan	Africa	and	the	 former	Soviet	
Union	two	major	themes	in	theories	of	the	relationship	between	corruption	and	development.	
These	 are,	 firstly,	 that	 corruption	hinders	 development	 and	 the	 sharing	 of	 its	 benefits,	which	
regularly	leads	to	the	corollary	that	eradicating	corruption	would	deliver	more	development	and	
fairer	 shares	 of	 its	 fruits	 between	 and	within	 countries.	 Secondly,	 corruption	 is	 attendant	 on	
earlier	stages	development,	which	often	leads	to	the	sanguine	conclusion	that	it	will	be	surpassed:	
more	development	will	produce	less	corruption.	MacWilliam	and	Rafferty	suggest	that	corruption	
is,	rather,	inherent	to	capitalism.	Primitive	accumulation	is	not	confined	to	the	arriving	phases	of	
capitalism;	 it	 is	 not	 all	 that	 ‘primitive.	 It	 stays	 with	 us	 and	 is	 continually	 reinvented	 anew.	
Neoliberalism	 introduces	new	opportunities	and	new	 forms	 in	which	capitalist	exploitation	 is	
intensified	and	extended.	
	
Kristian	 Lasslett’s	 contribution	 closely	 analyses	 corruption	 in	 the	 example	 of	 real	 estate	
development	 in	a	developing	country	context:	 that	of	Papua	New	Guinea.	The	state‐corporate	
crime	involved	is	transnational	and	neo‐colonial,	and	Australian‐based	capital	is	implicated.	Local	
politics	 and	 culture	 are	 important	 factors	 but	 Lasslett	 demonstrates	 how	 deeper	 and	 more	
thoroughgoing	empirical	study	reveals	broader	and	more	underlying	criminogenic	tendencies.	
Lasslett	 sets	 out	 methodological	 innovations	 for	 investigating	 such	 corruption	 robustly	 and	
profoundly,	 and	 these	will	 have	wide	 applicability	within	 critical	 criminological	 and	 political‐
economic	study.	
	
The	 third	 article,	 by	Rob	White,	 also	 deploys	 the	 concept	 of	 state‐corporate	 crime,	 here	 in	
relation	to	the	exploitation	of	natural	resources	and	the	associated	harms.	Its	empirical	focus	is	
on	these	processes	in	Australia:	from	forestry	and	pulp	mills	in	Tasmania;	to	mining	and	mineral	
loading	ports	in	Queensland;	and	to	petroleum	exploration	and	extraction	in	the	Timor	gap.	As	
well	as	‘direct	corruption’	involving	breaches	of	the	law,	we	must	consider	the	‘moral	corruption’	
in	 ‘undermining	of	 trust	and	respect	 for	established	governmental	processes	and	 institutional	
practices,	as	guided	by	democratic	oversight’	(White	2017:	56).	It	is	these	processes	of	oversight	
and	regulation	that	are	designed	to	mitigate	harm	arising	from	production	processes,	and	it	is	
precisely	these	that	neoliberalism	drives	to	roll	back.	A	key	ideological	weapon	in	this	struggle	
identified	 by	 White	 is	 this	 notion	 of	 security,	 and	 that	 environmental	 wellbeing	 must	 be	
subordinated	 to	 national	 security	 over	 natural	 ‘resources’.	 Lack	 of	 transparency	 is	
institutionalised,	as	are	anti‐democratic	processes.	
	
Steve	Matthewman	also	considers	the	aspects	of	neoliberalism	that	encourage	corruption,	this	
time	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 built	 environment	 in	 New	 Zealand,	 which	 has	 the	 most	 unaffordable	
housing	 in	 the	 world	 (The	 Economist	 2017).	 He	 gives	 the	 political‐economic	 background	 of	
deregulation	 and	 the	 housing	 crisis	 in	 New	 Zealand,	 and	 demonstrates	 their	 disastrous	
consequences	 in	 the	 housing	 construction	 industry:	 notably	 in	 the	 epidemic	 ‘leaky	 building’	
problem.	In	common	with	a	numbers	of	authors	in	this	issue,	Matthewman	endorses	Beetham’s	
(2015:	41)	advocacy	of	a	broader	definition	of	corruption	as	‘the	distortion	and	subversion	of	the	
public	realm	in	the	service	of	private	interests’.	There	is	a	telling	metaphor	here:	distortion	and	
subversion	of	 the	public	good	can	underlie	an	apparently	easy‐going	 liberalism,	 just	as	rotten	
timbers	 can	 be	 hidden	 behind	 superficially	 attractive	 cladding.	 We	 need	 to	 look	 below	 the	
exterior,	just	as	we	do	with	conceptions	of	corruption.	
	
Neoliberal	regimes	ideologically	urge	the	state	to	keep	out	of	the	way	of	business,	though	they	are	
not	 averse	 to	 receiving	 state	 loans	 (as	 in	 Adani’s	 case),	 infrastructure,	 resources	 and	 public	
procurement.	Paddy	Rawlinson’s	piece	deals	with	corruption	(again	broadly	defined)	involving	
transnational	pharmaceutical	corporations,	which	have	proven	to	be	notoriously	corrupt	when	
abetted	by	deregulation.	Yet,	in	the	case	of	their	marketing	of	vaccines,	these	same	corporations	
benefit	from	the	illiberal	intervention	of	the	state,	through	its	mandating	the	consumption	by	its	
citizens.	State	purchases	and	subsidies	are,	of	course,	substantial	as	well.	In	the	state‐corporate	
joint	enterprise	of	compelling	citizens	(including	and	especially	children)	to	be	inoculated	with	
particular	 products,	we	 see	 not	 only	 the	 familiar	 forms	 of	 corruption	 in	 bribery	 (or	 ‘gifts’	 or	
funding	or	political	donations)	to	professionals	and	officials	and	researchers	and	political	parties	
and	 representatives,	 of	 fraudulent	 claims	 and	 falsifications,	 and	 of	 ‘revolving	 doors’	 between	
public	office	and	private	enterprise,	but	also	the	corruption	of	science	itself	 in	the	interests	of	
profits	(nothing	new	here)	and	unlawful	breaches	of	human	rights	in	those	same	interests.	The	
right	to	prior,	 free	and	informed	consent,	based	on	adequate	 information,	 to	 ‘any	preventative,	
diagnostic	and	therapeutic	medical	intervention’	is,	Rawlinson	(2017:	89)	points	out,	safeguarded	
under	 international	 instruments	 such	 as	 the	 Universal	 Declaration	 on	 Bioethics	 and	 Human	
Rights.	Suppression	of	medical/scientific	dissent,	public	challenge	and	even	open	debate	is	made	
by	the	state	in	the	interests	of	‘Big	Pharma’	in	respect	of	vaccination;	knowledge	cannot	but	be	
corrupted	under	 such	a	 regime.	Here	we	 see	 another	 instance	of	what	Rob	White	 (2017:	66)	
problematised	as	the	‘democratic	deficit’	in	the	purported	interests	of	a	form	of	national	security	
identified	with	the	nation.	
	
Finally,	Greg	Martin’s	 article	 also	 deals	 with	 the	 erosion	 of	 civil	 liberties	 in	 the	 interests	 of	
national	security	–	 in	this	case	 in	the	context	of	Australia’s	prosecution	of	 the	 ‘war	on	 terror’.	
Martin’s	socio‐legal	analysis	shows	how	democratic	principles	and,	 indeed,	 the	rule	of	 law	are	
ever	more	sacrificed	to	the	expediencies	of	counter‐terrorism.	Secrecy	provisions—and,	in	fact,	
unlawful	cover‐ups	often	facilitated	by	these—are	central	to	this	process.	Asylum	seekers	and	
even	motorcycle	 associations	 alike	 are	 shown	 in	 this	 article	 to	 be	 subjected	 to	 regimes	 that,	
through	their	secrecy,	corrupt	democracy	and	lawful	governance.	
	
Given	this	evidence,	we	cannot	accept	that	Transparency	International’s	assessment	of	the	New	
Zealand	and	Australian	corruption	problem	is	accurate.	Yet,	if	we	accept	as	true	that	the	forms	of	
corruption	 that	 we	 find	 in	 New	 Zealand	 and	 Australia	 are	 not	 visible	 at	 every	 point	 in	 the	
system—we	 are	 certainly	 not	 at	 the	 point	 where	 police	 officers	 and	 public	 officials	 openly	
demand	 bribes	 and	 neither	 are	 we	 at	 the	 point	 where	 regulatory	 enforcement	 is	 routinely	
undermined	by	bribes—then	the	much	bigger	challenge	for	these	countries,	as	we	have	seen,	is	
the	 cosy	 relationship	 that	 exists	 between	 public	 officials	 and	 business	 generally,	 rather	 than	
relationships	 that	 are	 tainted	 by	 bribes.	 A	 caveat	 is	 necessary	 here,	 however.	 There	 is	
overwhelming	evidence	that	these	close	relationships	that	influence	public	policy—ranging	from	
access	to	ministers	and	public	officials,	to	their	favourable	attention	to	the	interests	of	particular	
industries	 or	 corporations	 and	 even	 their	 enthusiastic	 promotion	 of	 these—are	 enhanced	 by	
donations	 to	 political	 parties.	 These	 may	 not	 strictly	 be	 bribery,	 nor	 unlawful—though	 they	
sometimes	involve	both	aspects—but	they	do	involve	harmful	prioritising	of	private	and	partisan	
material	benefit	over	public	interest	and	common	weal.	
	
A	number	of	commentators	including	David	Beetham	(2015)	and	Nicholas	Shaxson	(2016)	are	
now	 proposing	 that,	 if	 we	 understand	 corruption	more	 broadly	 as	 a	 set	 of	 relationships	 and	
practices	that	systematically	undermine	the	public	interest,	then	we	can	begin	to	understand	the	
phenomenon	as	one	that	is	embedded	in	the	developed	world.	Christensen,	Shaxson	and	Baker	
(2008)	argues	 that:	 ‘[c]orruption	 involves	abusing	 the	public	 interest	and	undermining	public	
confidence	in	the	integrity	of	rules,	systems	and	institutions	that	promote	the	public	interest’.		
	
This	is	a	definition	that	would	capture	all	of	the	examples	covered	in	the	special	issue.	And	as	the	
articles	 in	 this	 issue	 will	 show,	 the	 challenge	 of	 measuring	 and	 understanding	 ‘corruption	
downunder’	is	found	in	the	collusive	ways	that	a	range	of	institutions	have	been	permitted	and	
encouraged	to	undermine	the	public	 interest	 in	the	countries	here	examined,	especially	in	the	
neoliberal	period.	
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